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Abstrak : Tujuan penelitian ini adalah menilai hubungan antara tata kelola 
perusahaan dan nilai pemegang saham dengan sturktur modal sebagai mediator. 
Sampel dalam penelitian ini adalah 231 perusahaan yang terdaftar di Bursa Efek 
Indonesia untuk periode 2000 – 2012 yang diuji secara empiris. Data panel dinamis 
dipakai untuk menguji hubungan antara tata kelola perusahaan dan nilai pemegang 
saham dengan struktur modal sebagai variabel mediasi. Hasil penelitian 
menunjukkan bahwa komposisi dewan, kepemilikan dewan, kepemilikan institusi 
dan profitabilitas berpengaruh secara signifikan terhadap nilai pemegang saham 
(Tobin’s q) dengan rasio hutang sebagai variabel mediasi. Penelitian ini memberikan 
bukti empiris bagi karakteristik dewan dan struktur kepemilikan untuk 
meningkatkan struktur modal perusahaan dan nilai pemegang saham bagi 
perusahaan publik di Indonesia dan akan bermanfaat bagi lembaga pembuat 
keputusan, praktisi bisnis dan akademisi. 
  
Kata kunci: Bursa Efek Indonesia, Tata kelola Perusahaan, Struktur Modal,  
  Tobin’s q  
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Capital structure and corporate governance have succeeded in attracting much 
research interest. One of the reasons is that when there are good corporate 
governance practices in the application of capital structure policies then the 
administration practices of the business entities will be efficient and these provide 
support for the increase in firms’ performance. Good corporate governance practices 
assist firms to access financing better and at a lower cost (Claessens & Fan, 2002; 
Liew, 2009), and ensures that boards and managers are accountable. It also assists 
firms to attract lower cost of financing by increasing investors’ confidence (Liew, 
2009).  Additionally, investors would be willing to pay an extra cost if the company 
has good governance practices and this helps firms to increase share price (FCGI, 
2004) 
Meanwhile, boards of directors have been criticized for their role in 
reducing shareholders value and to some extend resulted in corporate failures. Some 
of the reasons for the decline in shareholders value are due to board of directors not 
practicing good governance and instead desire to preserve private benefits more than 
share value (Black, Jang & Kim, 2006). Nekhili and Cherif (2011) found that a large 
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number of directors and main shareholders are involved in scandals such as carrying 
out related party transaction for their own interest. Further, weak corporate 
governance mechanisms will lead to poor debt management. Firms lose billions of 
dollars due to poor corporate governance policies and declining share price (Black, 
2001) and higher leverage had lead to poor stock price (Mitton, 2002).  
In the case of Indonesia, evidence showed that most of Indonesian firms have a 
low level awareness of practicing good governance and this had caused many 
deficiencies. Many Indonesian firms are still behind other Asian countries in the 
implementation of good corporate governance practices and had shown low 
profitability and higher debt (Sang-Woo Nam, 2004). Forum of Corporate 
Governance in Indonesia (2004) further showed that as a consequence of the weak  
governance practices, the Indonesian stock exchange firms caused shows low 
effectiveness  in  business decisions with firms having high debt and tendency for 
default in paying the debt. In addition, from the perceptions of analysts and fund 
managers, it is of the opinioned that Indonesia performs corporate governance 
practices relatively poorly (Cheung & Jang, 2008) with some firms become 
bankrupt. Some of these bankrupt firms involved Indonesian airlines such as 
Sempati Air (1998), Indonesia Airlines (2003), Adam Air (2008), and the newest 
being Batavia air in 2013. The main problem involving these Indonesian airlines is 
attributed to huge debt and bad corporate governance practices.  
 
PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Capital structure, corporate governance and the effect on value had been studied for 
years, but just very few researchers stressed on corporate governance in relation to 
capital structure and the impact created on shareholder value.  
In Indonesia, low level of firm performance could be caused by weak level 
of corporate governance, but if the firm adopted and implemented corporate 
governance and the firm performance was still unsatisfactory and low, could it be 
because of higher levels of debt? Therefore, performance effects of corporate 
governance especially boards’ attributes is simply incomplete without sufficient 
knowledge of mechanisms to differentiate performance driven values (Van Essen et 
al., 2012). Since firms can utilize the debt because of the debt’s value enhancing this 
will help the firm with needed capital to support a sum of investment opportunities. 
Higher independent boards with separate management composition, will perhaps use 
more leverage because if utilized well will enhance shareholder value. Therefore, 
firms with good external financing are expected to pursue growth opportunities to 
create better shareholder value.  
Moreover, Kassim, Ishak and Manaf (2013) showed capital structure as 
important predictors of shareholder value. They suggested that leverage as important 
examined as a potential mediator for the board process. The mediating variables help 
to explain board process and firm performance relationship. Board effectivess in 
affecting the capital structure will influence shareholder value, which results in 
positive firm performance. 
Research findings showed that inverstor were willing to pay a premium for 
shares of good corporate governance practices for firms. Good corporate governance 
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is also viewed as an important factor by creditors. Therefore, good corporate 
governance does matter and contribute a significant value to firms. From agency 
theory perpectives, the board monitoring function is very important. As the decision 
making falls to top management, the board should vigously monitor the decision 
making and firm performance as a whole (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Wen et al. 
(2002), Berger & Bonaccorsi di Patti (2006) and Graham et al. (2011) pointed out 
that corporate governance influences shareholder value through strategic decisions. 
Decision on capital structure is the essential part of strategies implementation 
(David, 2008). The cases of some Indonesian Airlines showed the evidences that 
highly leverage capital structure led to firm failure. Therefore as proposed by Wen et 
al. (2002), Berger & Bonaccorsi di Patti (2006), David (2008) and Graham et al. 
(2011) this study will incorporate leverage as mediator variable. The proposal is 
similar to the recommendation by La Rocca (2007), Van Essen., et al (2012) and 
Kassim., et al (2013), where it was pointed out that corporate governance, capital 
structure and shareholder value should be incorporated in a study. 
 
RESEARCH QUESTION  
The above discussions lead to the following research question that remains to be 
answered is: what is the relationship between corporate governance and shareholder 
value in Indonesian Stock Exchange firms with capital structure as a mediating? 
 
OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY  
This research attempts to accomplish one main objective namely: to examine the 
relationship between corporate governance and shareholder value with capital 
structure as a mediating variable. 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
Studies of corporate governance and shareholders value relationship produced mixed 
results. Prior research established a link between boards’ structure and firm 
performance (Yermack, 1996; Dalton et al., 1998; Abdullah, 2004; Brown & Caylor, 
2006; Ghabayen, 2012), including ownership structure and firm performance 
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Bushee, 1998; Uadiale, 2010; Moradi et al., 2012). Other 
studies also established the same results and found positive relationship (Wen et al., 
2002; Claessens & Fan, 2002; Jiraporn et al., 2012; Kajananthan, 2012).  
Board governance and ownership structure is expected to improve 
shareholder value through the effect on firm leverage. The Indonesian 1997 crisis 
showed that excessive leverage led to firm failure. The evidence seemed to suggest 
that if the board did not mitigate the risks of having excessive leverage, the company 
was more likely to suffer (Murphy & Brown, 2009). Increases in leverage, in turn 
led to lower returns to shareholders. Firms with high dependency on debt financing 
have to pay fixed borrowing cost and banks tend to charge firms a higher interest 
rate because of the possibility of defaulting on borrowings being higher. This 
situation reduces the firms’ earning significantly and affects firm performance as a 
whole. This helps in understanding that firm performance suffers by having 
ineffective board members who are not able to encourage less risky capital structure 
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(Johnson, Daily & Ellstrand, 1996). Thus, when directors perform their role 
effectively, they are expected to influence management to invest in a less risky 
capital structure (Kassim et al., 2013). Kassim et al. (2013) found that effective 
independent directors and boards who monitored firm risk vigorously were more 
likely to monitor management from adopting excessive leverage, which resulted in 
positive firm performance. 
Furthermore, prior research showed that capital structure and firm 
performance had a positive association. Empirical research found that capital 
structure could lead to firm performance improvement (Harvey et al., 2004; San & 
Heng, 2011; Moradi et al., 2012; Onel & Gansuwan, 2012). Board monitoring 
function is very important from agency theory perspectives. As the decision making 
falls to top management, the board should vigously monitor the decision making and 
firm performance as a whole (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Johnson et al. (1996), Wen 
et al. (2002), Berger & Bonaccorsi di Patti (2006), and Graham et al. (2011) point 
out that corporate governance influences strategic decisions namely leverage and 
thereby influences shareholder value. Decision on capital structure is the essential 
part of strategies implementation (David, 2008). Therefore as proposed by Johnson 
et al. (1996), Wen et al. (2002), Berger & Bonaccorsi di Patti (2006), David (2008) 
and Graham et al. (2011) this study will incorporate leverage as mediator variable. 
The proposal is similar to the recommendation by La Rocca (2007), Van Essen., et 
al (2012) and Kassim et al (2013) where it was pointed out that corporate 
governance, capital structure and shareholder value should be incorporated in a 
study. 
 
Corporate governance attributes 
Board Size 
Several studies reported that large board size negatively influences firm performance 
(Yermack, 1996; Eisenberg, Sundgren & Wells, 1998; De Andres, Azofra & Lopez, 
2005). Operating efficiency and CEO performance appear to decline as board size 
grows. This is because of the disadvantages of worse coordination, flexibility and 
communication between large board size (De Andres et al., 2005; Tchouassi & 
Nosseyamba, 2011). Contrary, an analysis by Kiel and Nicholson (2003) found that 
larger boards have superior performance, because they can more monitor and control 
organization and the companies have more resources to links with other 
organizations. Abidin et al. (2009); Uadiale (2010) and Tchouassi & Nosseyamba 
(2011) findings support this relationship and suggest that board size should be 
encouraged and composition of outside directors as member of board should be 
sustained and be increased to enhance corporate financial performance and 
shareholder value maximization. These results imply that large board size performs 
effectively. 
 
Board Composition 
Empirical evidence of outside directors’ performance to increase firm performance 
is varied. Some of the results showed that higher ROE, profits, dividends and stock 
repurchase are more likely achieved by higher outside directors than firms with low 
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external directors (Brown & Caylor, 2006; Abidin et al., 2009). Board processes, 
decision making by the board, and firm performance may improve, because 
independent directors possess various backgrounds, attributes, characteristics and 
expertise for good decision making. Further, Uadiale (2010) argued that the 
composition of outside directors can monitor and control management thereby 
increase firm performance. Others results of study such as De Andres  et al. (2005) 
and Moradi et al. (2012) found negative relationship between firm value and board 
composition. This might be because of weak performance of non executive members 
that not function well. Erkens et al. (2012) found that firms with more independent 
boards had worse stock returns than other firms by raising more equity capital 
during the crisis, which leads to a wealth transfer from existing shareholders to debt 
holders. 
 
Board Ownership 
Managerial shareholding could made shareholders and managers interest aligned. 
When firm paid out cash dividend, the managers get dividend and benefit of their 
equity (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Chen and Chen (2012) argued shareholder will 
get more benefit from more managerial ownership such as increase their value and 
reduce agency conflicts.  Uadiale (2010) found that directors’ stockholding and 
firms financial performance measures have an inverse sign. Contra findings come 
from Abidin et al.  (2009), they found that the effects of directors’ ownership and 
firms total resources for value added are not confirmed. On average, directors are 
not motivated by holding equity, perhaps they rewards and benefits are higher than 
dividend. 
 
Institutional Ownership 
Institutional investors tend to influence corporate governance process and are more 
efficient than individual investor. Increased institutionalization seems to improve the 
efficiency of governance role in capital market. Higher institutional ownership is 
associated with significantly better stock price performance (Bushee, 1998; Mitton, 
2002). Further support come from Moradi et al. (2012), found that the existence of 
institutional ownership to firms performance measured by ROI and Tobin’s q has a 
direct effect. The arguement might be that in particular firms’ profitability is 
positively and significantly correlated with institutional shareholders. Institutional 
investors have an incentives and power to monitor and control management 
behaviour. On the other hand, Erkens et al. (2012) found that higher institutional 
ownership had worse stock returns caused larger shareholder losses. This occurred 
because more risk they took during the crisis.  
 
Control Variables: Firm Size and Profitability  
In this research we choose  firm size and profitability as a control variable to 
examine relationship among corporate governance, capital structure and shareholder 
value, because there are consistent used by many researchers  and based on previous 
literature as factors that may be associated with corporate governance and capital 
structure and firm value. Firm size and firm performance is positively related 
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(Kyereboah-Coleman, 2007; Abidin et al., 2009). When firm grow and become 
bigger with well debt utilization then firm performance will increase. De Andres et 
al. (2005), found that profitabitlity and corporate governance has a positive 
relationship. 
 
Corporate Governance, Shareholder Value and Capital Structure as a 
Mediator 
Board monitoring function is very important from agency theory perspectives. As 
the decision making falls to top management, the board should vigously monitor the 
decision making and firm performance as a whole (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). 
Johnson et al. (1996), Wen et al. (2002), Berger & Bonaccorsi di Patti (2006), and 
Graham et al. (2011) point out that corporate governance influences strategic 
decisions namely leverage and thereby influences shareholder value. Decision on 
capital structure is the essential part of strategies implementation (David, 2008).  
  La Rocca (2007) argues that role of moderation and/or mediation of 
corporate governance should be considered on the relation between capital structure 
and firm’s value. It is necessary to consider the presence of complementarities 
between capital structure and corporate governance variables such as: ownership 
concentration and board of directors.  
Van Essen et al. (2012) argue that mediating role of capital structure can be 
derived from the board role of corporate governance. Performance effects of 
corporate governance especially boards attributes is simply incomplete without 
sufficient knowledge of mechanisms that drive performance differences. Since firms 
can utilize the debt because debt has value enchancing and to help firm with needed 
capital to support a sum of investment opportunities.  Shareholder tends to own firm 
is likely to shun debt financing. Firms with more independent boards and a separate 
leadership structure are likely to promote more leverage to create more shareholders 
value. Therefore, firms with good external financing are expected to pursue 
investment and better shareholder value. 
Intervening or mediating variables between corporate governance and 
shareholder value could be examined to find out the way and timing of corporate 
governance in enchancing shareholder value (Van Essen et al., 2012). Kassim et al. 
(2013) examined the influence of board process to firm performance with capital 
structure decisions as a mediator. The presence of mediating variable helps to 
explain board process to firm performance effects. Meanwhile, the effectiveness of 
board affects capital structure and influences shareholder value. The study found 
that effective independent directors and boards who monitor firm risk vigorously are 
more likely to monitor management from adopting excessive leverage, which 
resulted in positive firm performance.  
The cases of some Indonesian Airlines have shown the evidences that highly 
leverage capital structure lead to firm failure. Therefore as proposed by Johnson et 
al. (1996), Wen et al. (2002), Berger & Bonaccorsi di Patti (2006); David (2008) and 
Graham et al. (2011) this study will incorporate leverage as a mediator variable. We 
focus capital structure as the mediators because prior research showed that capital 
structure is important predictors of shareholder value.The proposal is similar to the 
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recommendation by La Rocca (2007),  Van Essen et al. (2012) and Kassim et al. 
(2013). Where the authors point out that corporate governance, capital structure and 
shareholder value should be incorporated in a study. This leads to hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1:  Debt ratio mediates the relationship between board size and 
shareholder value.  
Hypothesis 2:  Debt ratio mediates the relationship between board composition 
and shareholder value.  
Hypothesis 3:   Debt ratio mediates the relationship between board ownership and 
shareholder value.  
Hypothesis 4:   Debt ratio mediates the relationship between institutional 
ownership and shareholder value.  
 
 
METHODOLOGY 
Sample 
Firms’ annual reports were samples for this study, published and available in the site 
of Indonesian stock exchange market and in data stream database for the period 
2000-2012. Long periods were better to get more understanding and to cover 
turbulent periods at the beginning of 2000 as the longer time period would be more 
volatile giving a full understanding of how corporate governance and debt work over 
the business cycle and affect overall shareholder value. The sample excluded the 
firms whose annual report or data were not available. However, firms in the 
financial services industry, banks, securities, finance institutions and insurance firms 
were excluded from this study because of the special regulations for these kinds of 
firms. The hospital industry was excluded too because of the existence of just one 
firm in this industry.  
With 440 firms listed in the Indonesian stock exchange, 358 firms were 
selected as shown in Table 1. The 82 firms excluded were from the banking, 
insurance, finance and hospital industries. Finally, from the 358 selected firms, 231 
firms were chosen and used in the model because of the availability of data from the 
year 2000 to 2012. 
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Table 1. Industry Type and Firm Selection 
Industry type Amount 
 Availability 
of data 
Advertising, Printing & Media 10 Selected 6 
Agricultural, forestry & fishing 21 Selected 12 
Insurance 11 Excluded 0 
Bank 31 Excluded 0 
Finance & investment companies 21 Excluded 0 
Hospital 1 Excluded 0 
Hotel & tourism 22 Selected 10 
Manufacturing 131 Selected 108 
Mining & mining services 35 Selected 17 
Real estate/construction 54 Selected 28 
Securities 18 Excluded 0 
Telecommunication 7 Selected 3 
Trade & wholesaler 55 Selected 37 
Transportation & infrastructure 23 Selected 10 
Grand Total 440 358 231 
 
Information relating to shareholder value (Tobin’s q), board size, board 
composition, board ownership, institutional ownership and debt ratio, was collected 
from firms’ annual reports and database that have been determined.   
 
   Variables Measurement 
This study adopts Tobin’s q performance variable to measured shareholder value. 
Total book value of liabilities and market capitalization divided by total book value 
of assets is Tobin’s q (Brainard & Tobin, 1968). Independent variable are: board 
size, board composition, board ownership and institutional ownership, are used as 
the proxy of corporate governance. Following this study, we employ debt ratio as the 
proxy of capital structure as a mediating variable (Kyereboah-Coleman, 2007; 
Bokpin, 2010). As a consideration of other omitted variables, control variable is 
included. As a variable control we used firm size and profitability in order to 
observe the relationship among corporate governance, capital structure and 
shareholder value.  
   
Statistical Analysis 
Panel data within 13-year period from 2000-2012 is used to examine these 
relationship. General method moment (GMM) using STATA software is used for 
the panel data analysis. GMM method provides instruments for board size, board 
composition, board ownership, institutional ownership and capital structure that are 
potentially endogenous. We used a dynamic panel data models by GMM approach 
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which one of the way to obtain consistent estimator of Y (coefficient) and to handle 
some missing data and to achived efficiency (Greene, 2002). The Arrellano-
Bover/Blundell-Bond with system GMM estimator is used (Arellano & Bond, 
1991).  
For model specification, we follow with previous literature (Saadah & 
Prijadi, 2012; Mousavi, Jari & Aliahmadi 2012 ), we estimate the following multiple 
regression models: 
 CAPS it = a + CGit + CONTROLit + μt        (1) 
 SHVit = a + CAPS it + CONTROLit + μt                        (2) 
SHVit = a + CGit + CONTROLit + μt                        (3)   
SHVit = a + CGit + CAPSit  + CONTROLit + μt                        (4) 
Where: 
CAPS it  = the capital structure of firm i at time t. 
CGit = corporate governance variables at time t 
SHVit  = the shareholder value of firm i at time t. 
CONTROLit  = control variables  at time t. 
From equations (1,2,3 and 4), the following equations were estimated: 
Multiple regression model for corporate governance variables and capital structure 
variables: 
DR = α + β1BSizeit +β2BComp it+ β3BOwnit+ β4InstOwnit + β5Fsizeit + β6Profitit + 
μit                                            (5) 
 
Multiple regression model for capital structure variables and shareholder value: 
Tobin’s q  = α + β1DRit + β2Fsizeit + β3Profitit  +  μit                      (6)   
 
Multiple regression  model for corporate governance variables and shareholder 
value: 
Tobin’s q = α + β1BSizeit + β2BComp it+ β3BOwnit+ β4InstOwnit + β6Fsizeit + 
β7Profitit  +  μit                                                                             (7) 
Multiple regression model for corporate governance variables, capital structure 
variables and shareholder value: 
Tobin’s q = α + β1BSizeit + β2BComp it+ β3BOwnit+ β4InstOwnit + β5DRit + 
β6Fsizeit + β7Profitit +  μit           (8)   
   
Where: 
α = intercept coefficient; β1= coefficient for each of the independent variables 
DR= debt ratio; Tobin’s q; Bsize= total number of board of directors; Bcomp= 
number of independent commissioners divided by total number of board of 
commissioners; Bown= fraction of outstanding shares owned by managers, directors 
and commissioners; InstOwn= fraction of outstanding shares held by institutional; 
Firm Size = natural log of annual sales; Profitability = the sum of net profit divided 
by total assets; μit  = the error term and varies with the individual firm and time. 
 
Mediation Test 
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To test for mediation, effects must meet four criterias. Firstly, the independent 
variable must influence the dependent variable. Secondly, the independent variable 
must influence the presumed mediator. Thirdly, the mediator must influence the 
dependent variable while controlling the independent variable. Finally, a previously 
significant relationship between the independent and dependent variables must be 
reduced in the presence of the mediator (Baron & Kenny, 1986).    
According to Baron and Kenny (1986), to establish mediation, the following 
conditions must hold: the independent variable must affect the mediator in the first 
equation; the independent variable must be shown to affect the dependent variable in 
the second equation; and the mediator must affect the dependent variable in the third 
equation. If these conditions all hold in the predicted direction, then the effect of the 
independent variable on the dependent variable must be less in the third equation 
than in the second equation. Perfect or full mediation holds if the independent 
variable has no effect when the mediator is controlled. Partial mediation holds, if 
independent variable still has the effect or significance when the mediator is 
controlled.  
Further, it is possible for the independent variable to have smaller 
coefficients when it alone predicts the dependent variable or direct relationship than 
when it and the mediator are in the equation (indirect relationship) but the larger 
coeeficient is not significant and the smaller one is significant. Baron and Kenny 
(1986) claimed that mediation is strongest when there is an indirect effect but not 
direct effect in equation 3. But the strength of mediation should be measured by the 
size of the indirect effect, not by the lack of the direct effect. The presence of the 
direct effect can inform the theorizing of other mediators. According to Zhao, John, 
Lynch and Chen (2010) there need not be a significant effect to be mediated in 
equation 2. There should be only one requirement to establish mediation, that 
indirect effect α x β is significant. 
To establish mediation, Baron and Kenny’s three equations are useful, but 
this is not because one must pass any of their tests. Regression equation 1 and 3 
estimate the parameters α and β used to test the indirect effect. But it is distribution 
of their product that matters. Therefore, we also applied product of the coefficient 
method to recheck the mediation effect, if we found from Baron and Kenny (1986), 
the direct coefficient is increased not reduced and still have significant effect when 
debt ratio was controlled. We applied Sobel’s formula , with the  equation :SEαβ=  
SQRT  α2 σ2 β + β2 σ2α + σ2α σ2 β;  z test= αβ/ SEαβ (Sobel, 1982). If the z test was > 
than +-1.96 then it would be concluded that the model had the mediation. If either α 
or β was not significant, there was said to be no mediation. If 1-3 held, we could 
conclude that there was partial mediation. If 1-3 held and c1 was not significantly 
different from zero, the effect was said to be perfect or full mediation. 
 
DATA ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS 
Descriptive Statistics of Variables 
The descriptive statistic for the dependent variables, independent variables and 
control variables are shown in Table 4.1. It reports the mean and standard deviation 
of the variables used in the study as well as the number of firm year observations 
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over the sample period. The mean of Tobin’s q is 0.96, this book value and market 
capitalization of the firms is lower than its assets, and this encourage firms to invest 
less in capital because the market value of assets are worth less than the price firms 
paid for them. 
The mean for leverage (debt ratio) from the  sample is 0.6108. This number reveals 
that an average of 61.08 percent of the firms assets were financed through funds 
raised from debt. This implies that most of the firm  use debt as the major source of 
funds (Myers, 2001; Saadah & Prijadi, 2012).  
 
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics of Variables 
Variable Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Min Max 
TobinsQ 0.9590 1.8248 -0.75643 49.4084 
DR 0.6108 0.5179 -0.5432 8.2450 
Firmsize 11.7118 1.0966 0 14.2743 
Profitability 0.0318 0.2718 -9.8778 4.6844 
Bsize 4.5986 1.9312 1 14.00 
Bcomp 0.3084 0.1867 0 1.00 
Bowns 0.0187 0.0551 0 0.6389 
Instown 0.6753 0.2110 0 1.00 
 
The descriptive statistics of corporate structure showed that on an  average, a board 
has 5 directors. Meanwhile, board commissioner on average is 30.84 percent. Based 
on code for good corporate governance, depending on the specific characteristics of 
a firm, at least 20 percent of the members of board commissioner should fall under 
the category of outside member. In terms of ownership structure, it is found that the 
average percentage of shares held by  board is only 1.87 percent. Though it is widely 
accepted that the shareholding of board may increase their commitment toward 
organization, the descriptive statictics showed that this is still not been established 
among Indonesian public listed firms. As such, the low level of board ownership  
corresponded to the high ownership by institutional. Interestingly, the average 
percentage owned by institutional  is 67.53 percent, suggesting that the dominant 
shareholder of Indonesian firms are institutions.  
 
Correlation Analysis 
Table 3 reports the Pearson correlation coefficients for the firm, shareholder value, 
and capital structure and governance variables. The correlations among variables are 
generally low, suggesting that each governance variable is a stand alone element and 
not highly correlated. 
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Table 3. Correlation Matrix 
 
 
Tobins     
Q DR 
Firm 
size Profit 
Bsize Bcom
p Bowns 
Inst 
own 
TobinsQ 1.000 
  
     
DR 0.306* 1.000 
 
     
Firm 
size -0.003 
-
0.041* 1.000  
 
   
Profit 
-
0.284* 
-
0.267* 0.166* 1.000 
 
   
Bsize 0.031 
-
0.077* 0.434* 0.108* 
1.000 
   
Bcomp  0.023 -0.008 0.101* 0.022 0.052* 1.000   
Bowns 
-
0.089* 
-
0.047* 
-
0.089* 0.03 
-
0.118* 
-
0.052* 1.000  
Instown 0.051* -0.030 0.001 0.058* 0.087* 
-
0.058* 
-
0.278* 1.000 
* significant at α = 0.05; ** significant at α = 0.01; *** significant at α = 0.001  
          
Regression Results between Corporate Governance and Shareholder Value 
with Capital Structure as a Mediator  
Multicolinearity test is also carried out. As a rule of thumb,  if the tolerance value of 
more than 0.10 and variance inflation factor (VIF) of less than 10 indicated no 
serious collinearity problem (Gujarati, 2003). The test shows no serious 
multicollinearity exist among the independent variables, mediating variable and 
control variables. The test indicated that there is no evidence of multicolinearity 
since the VIF values are between the range of 1.03 and 1.34 with mean VIF 1.14. 
Table 4 to Table 5 showed the analysis of mediation effects of capital 
structure on the relationship between corporate governance and shareholder value. 
As suggested by Baron and Kenny (1986), mediation regression analysis needs to go 
through three steps. Perfect or full mediation holds if the independent variable has 
no effect when the mediator is controlled. Partial mediation holds, if independent 
variable still has the effect or significant when the mediator is controlled. Further, it 
is possible for the independent variable to have smaller coefficients when it alone 
predicts the dependent variable or direct relationship than when it and the mediator 
are in the equation (indirect relationship). According to Zhao, John, Lynch, & Chen 
(2010) there need not be a significant effect to be mediated in equation 2. To 
establish mediation, Baron and Kenny’s there equations are useful, but this is not 
because one must pass any of their test. Therefore, we also apply product of 
coefficient method (Sobel, 1982) to recheck the mediaton effect. If the Z test is > 
than 1.96 then it is concluded that the model has the mediation. 
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The relationship between corporate governance and capital structure in step 
1 shows that board composition, board ownership, institutional ownership and 
profitability have a significant effect to debt ratio. While, the result in step 2 shows 
that there is a significant relationship between corporate governance and shareholder 
value, therefore we can proceed to step 3. The relationship between corporate 
governance, Tobin’s q and capital structure as a mediator as shown in step 3.  
 
Table 4. Regression results of  Corporate Governance and Capital Structure (step 1) 
Number of obs = 2744 
Wald chi2 (15)  
 = 3047.1 
Prob > chi2 = 
0.0000 
 
DR Coeff. 
Std 
err t-stat  Sig. 
DR 
L1 0.4889*** 
0.010 
49.72 0.000 
Bsize -0.0022 0.002 -0.89 0.372 
Bcomp -0.1046*** 0.014 -7.74 0.000 
Bowns  -0.1878 0.124 -1.52 0.130 
Instown -0.2101*** 0.032 -6.65 0.000 
Firm size  -0.0002 0.003 -0.08 0.938 
Profitability  -0.3136*** 0.009 -36.6 0.000 
Constant 0.4776*** 0.047 -10.08 0.000 
 * significant at α = 0.05; ** significant at α = 0.01; *** significant at α = 0.001 
 
Table 4.5 shows that debt level does not mediate the relationship between board size 
and Tobin’s q. Since board size still has no significant relationship with Tobin’s q 
and Z test is less than 1.96 when the company debt is controlled, the result shows 
that there is no mediation effect of firm leverage, suggesting that board size have no 
effects on Tobin’s q when firm leverage is included.  
Debt ratio mediates the relationship between board composition and Tobin’s 
q. Comparing unstandardized coefficients for board composition (unstandardized 
coefficients = 0.3258) and related directly to Tobin’s q. After mediating by debt the 
unstandardized coefficients increases to 0.7198  for board composition and become  
significant with t-value= 9.410. The significant value in board composition changes 
from significant to significant,  unstandardized coefficient  increased after the firm 
debt has been controlled and the results of Z test is 5.04 > 1.96 (Table 4.5), indicates 
the partial mediation of firm leverage. 
Debt ratio mediates the relationship between board ownership and Tobin’s 
q. Turning the unstandardized coefficients from -1.5139 to -1.8157, from negative 
significant in direct relationship to negative significant in indirect relationship (t-
value=-3.010 to t-value -2.920) and Z test is -2.9985>- 1.96 with presence of debt 
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ratio as a mediating variable between board ownership and Tobin’s q, indicates the 
partial mediation of firm leverage. 
 
 
Table 5. Regression results of Corporate Governance, Tobin’s q  (step 2) 
 
Number of obs = 2744       
Wald chi2 (15) = 16373.88     
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000      
Tobin’s Q      
 
Coeff. Std err t-stat  Sig. 
TobinsQ 
L1 0.2641*** 
0.003 
87.22 0.000 
Bsize -0.0097 0.011 -0.90 0.367 
Bcomp 0.3258*** 0.064 5.11 0.000 
Bowns -1.5139** 0.503 -3.01 0.003 
Instown 0.8261*** 0.117 7.08 0.000 
Firm size -0.0270* 0.012 -2.29 0.022 
Profitability -2.371*** 0.174 -31.85 0.000 
Constant 0.4276** 0.163 2.62 0.009 
* significant at α = 0.05; ** significant at α = 0.01; *** significant at α = 0.001 
 
Using debt as mediating variable onto the relationship between institutional 
ownership and shareholder value shows a positive relationship. From significant to 
higher positive significant with the presence of debt ratio (t-value=7.080 and t-
value=7.520). Unstandardized coefficients changed from 0.8261 to 0.9860 and Z test 
is 6.9305 > 1.96. Higher institutional ownership shows an increase in shareholder 
value if leverage is increased. Increase in institutional ownership will increase 
shareholder value with the presence of debt ratio with higher value that is 0.50. 
Since the significant for the institutional ownership changed when the company debt 
is controlled, the result shows that there is a partial mediation effect of firm 
leverage.  
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Table 6. Analysis of Corporate Governance and Tobin’s q with Capital 
Structure as a Mediator  (step 3) 
Number of obs = 2744 
Wald chi2 (16) = 11582.3 
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 
Tobin’s 
Q 
Direct 
Coef. 
Indirect 
Coef. 
Direct 
t 
Indire
ct t 
Z test Conclusion 
Tobin’s 
Q L1  
0.2421
**
*
 
87.22
0 
60.32
0 
  
Bsize -.0097
 
-
0.011
***
 -0.900 -0.920 
-
0.881
2 
Not supported 
Bcomp 
0.3258
**
*
 
0.7198
**
*
 5.110 9.410 
5.040
3 
Partial mediation 
Bowns 
-
1.5139
**
*
 
-
1.8157
**
 -3.010 -2.920 
-
2.998
5 
Partial mediation 
Instown 
0.8261
**
*
 
0.9860
**
*
 7.080 7.520 
6.930
5 
Partial mediation 
DR 
1.7579
**
* 
1.8164
**
*
 36.78 
32.60
0 
  
Firm size 
-
0.0270
**
*
 
-
0.0471
**
*
 -2.290 -4.280 
1.293
1 
Not supported 
Profitabil
ity 
- 
2.371
***
 
-
1.9425
**
*
 
-
31.85
0 
-
28.55
0 
12.30
74 
partial mediation 
Constant 0.4276
**
 
-
0.6688
**
*
 2.620 -3.600 
  
* significant at α = 0.05; ** significant at α = 0.01; *** significant at α = 0.001 
 
Using debt as mediating variable onto the relationship between firm size and 
Tobin’s q shows a negative relationship. Since the z test less then 1.96 when the 
company debt is controlled, the result shows that there is no mediation effect of firm 
leverage, suggesting that firm size has no effects on Tobin’s q even when firm 
leverage is included.  Debt mediates the relationship between profitability  and 
Tobin’s q. Since the significant for the profitability changed when the company debt 
is controlled and the z test is higher than 1.96, the result shows that there is a partial 
mediation effect of firm leverage. 
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Overall, debt ratio as a mediating variable for the relationship between 
corporate governance and shareholder value is consistent with  the study of Van 
Essen et al., 2012 and Kassim et al., 2013. The effectiveness of corporate 
governance variables in influencing the capital structure will influence shareholder 
value. 
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
This study indicates that Indonesian listed firms practice higher debt policy with 
higher institutional ownership and yet shows low profitability. The result showed 
that board size and firm size do not affect Tobin’s q  when level of debt is used as a 
mediator. The result implies that larger board would not be advantageous for the 
firms because they could not perform effectively and could not utilize leverage well 
to increase shareholder value. Board composition, board ownership, institutional 
ownership and profitability affect the Tobin’s q when level of debt is used as a 
mediator. The result indicates that the effective board independent influences 
management to adopt lower leverage, which in turn enhances shareholder value. The 
independent board monitors managers more actively, causing these managers to 
adopt lower leverage to avoid performance pressures associated with the 
commitments to disgorge large amount of cash (Jensen, 1986). Managers who face 
stronger board independent might pursue lower debt levels to avoid extra risk 
associated with higher leverage (Wen et al., 2002). Vigorous monitoring by the 
board tends to put pressure on management, causing the manager to be more prudent 
in decision makings. This in turn, brings positive effect to company capital structure 
decisions and performance (Kassim et al., 2013). These help to explain how 
effective independent boards are able to influence shareholder value by encouraging 
less risky capital structure.  
In addition, the results indicate that board ownership and institutional 
shareholder influences management to adopt lower leverage, which in turn enhances 
shareholder value. Institutional shareholder regulates actively so as to avoid 
receiving interest debt (Rezaei et al., 2012). Moreover, firms with high leverage 
ratios provide a negative signal that the firm faces a future of financial difficulties. It 
implies that firms which have a large proportion of board and institutional investors 
are less likely to meet their financing needs using debt. This helps to explain how 
effective board ownership and institutional shareholders are able to influence 
shareholder value by encouraging less risky capital structure. Further, increase in  
profitability will decrease shareholder value lower than without leverage. 
Based on this result, investor should invest into a company with larger proportion of 
board composition, larger board ownership and larger proportion of institutional 
ownership. Investors should be aware of the importance of changing corporate 
governance impact on shareholder value. On the other hand, investor who does not 
like to take risk should invest into a company with a small board size. Increase in 
firm size and profitability will decrease shareholder value, lower than without 
leverage. An investor should put his money to a company with a large asset. Besides 
that, a company with a high profitability attracts more investors and tends to lower 
the investors riskiness. 
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This study has some limitations namely: a sample of 231 publicly traded 
Indonesian and established firms for period 2000 till 2012 is used in this study. 
Therefore the results only apply to firms that have survived for a long time. This 
restricts the range of phenomenon studied. The study only examined corporate 
governance practices variables from internal factors and not from external factors.  
Besides that this study only examined capital structure as a mediator for corporate 
governance and shareholder value. Further studies could also enchance corporate 
governance variables from other internal variables such as bad financial conditions 
and external such as investment opportunity and also corporate governance as a 
mediator and/or moderator for the relationship between capital structure and 
shareholder value might make the study more comprehensive.  
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